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I don't think so. An axiom system can infer that if its axioms are self-consistent, then its Godel sentence is true. An axiom system just can't determine its own self-consistency. But then neither can human mathematicians know whether the axioms they explicitly favor are self-consistent. Putting aside the mind, incompleteness theorem shakes the very foundations of mathematics. If an axiomatic system can be proven to be consistent from within itself, then it is inconsistent. Gödel's argument shows that conscious understanding is something that cannot be properly imitated by a computer. If consciousness is part of physics and therefore describable by the *true* laws of physics, then the true laws of physics must be non-computable, and computers can therefore not imitate human mind.

Do Gödellian arguments refute a computational model of the mind? For a theory writable as computer program, any such theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. For any consistent formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true, but not provable in the theory.

For any formal theory T including basic arithmetical truths and also certain truths about formal provability, T includes a statement of its own consistency if and only if T is inconsistent. Godel's incompleteness theorem implications.