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What I meant to define was that archetypal patterns emerge which create comparable definitions. Therefore the only argument for sheerly flexible morality is an argument for the functionality of evil. But such a position is arbitrary, not relative. And no one should be willing to establish that an arbitrary evil must exist. In some ways this resembles discussions of free-will: there should be a foundation, but not everyone finds it.In what I call specie-functionism, distinct categories of functionality define that a moral priority is either present or absent. Then multi-variant paradigmatics, in proportion to resources, every functional paradigm is a form of morality (according to the idea that pain is inefficient). Consequently modalities are realized as forms of good or evil, depending on resources or sheer backwardness. To some extent evil is only the "wrong resourcefulness" it is not relative at all. Lets consider the thought that morality is based on absolute good recognized through reason. It assumes following:

- there is absolute good,
- there is absolute truth about this good,
- our reason is capable or knowing this truth.

Are these assumptions true?

If morality is based on current cultural norms of society I live in, then yes, it can only be relative. If morality is based on absolute good that can be discovered with the faculty of reason innate to all of us, then morality can be absolute. Is morality relative?
Truth is relative.